

NEWSCASTER:

An Iranian Threat Within Social Networks



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Executive Summary

Key Points:

- More than 2000 people are connected to the NEWSCASTER network of false personas, which has existed since at least 2011.
- The personas are supported by fictitious personal content, family relationships and the front media outlet NewsOnAir.org.
- Operators have intimated an interest in specifically targeted defense contractors and senior military and government officials.
- Malicious activity is tied to personas and the NewsOnAir.org website, and victims were sent links to credential collection websites that appear to be web portals.
- A review of the adversary's activities suggests they operate on Tehran's professional schedule.

Since at least 2011, a network of fake personas we have dubbed NEWSCASTER has been sending social engineering content to senior military and government officials and the private sector in the US and Israel. Many of the personas are linked to the fictitious news agency NewsOnAir.org, which reposts and credits themselves with the work of other media outlets to legitimize personas as journalists. While the ultimate sponsor of this activity is unknown, several indicators suggest it originates in Iran. This incident underscores the threats posed by social networking platforms and affirms that enterprises must take steps to control the human factors that may place them at risk. Though the covert nature of this campaign obscures its impact, successful compromises could be leveraged for diplomatic, military and other strategic advantages and possibly even used as reconnaissance for attack.

The NEWSCASTER Threat

We believe NEWSCASTER is a long-term, resource intensive cyber espionage operation motivated by the prospect of strategic intelligence. Targeting, professional operational schedule and complexity suggest this activity is carried out by Iranian actors, though there is a dearth of information implicating its ultimate sponsor.

- Personas are used to directly target several current and former senior
 US military and diplomatic personnel and several specific defense contracting firms in the US and Israel. Though targeting of organizational senior leadership and those associated with the defense industrial base (DIB) are tactics that have been used in hacktivist activity, long-term persistent
- reconnaissance and exploitation of specific targets is inconsistent with actors who intend to ultimately expose their operations.The activity is carried out from infrastructure previously registered in Tehran and co-hosted with
- other Iranian websites. The activity also appears to occur in line with a professional schedule feasible for actors located in Tehran.
- The network of personas is exceptionally complex, including dozens of accounts with fictitious personal and professional material, many of whom claim to work for the news provider NewsOnAir.org.





Personas Across Multiple Platforms

iSIGHT Partners has uncovered multiple social networking accounts leveraged in a coordinated, longterm cyber espionage campaign since at least 2011. The network of personas is interconnected and supported by an extensive social engineering regimen that crosses multiple social networking platforms and websites.

• iSIGHT Partners has uncovered more than a dozen operational fictitious personas residing on Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and other platforms connected to more than 2000 accounts.

Persona	Purported Profession	Known Platforms	Known Connections
Sandra Maler	Reporter, NewsOnAir	LinkedIn, Facebook,	226
		Twitter, Google	
Adia Mitchell	Reporter, NewsOnAir	LinkedIn, Facebook,	281
		Twitter, Wordpress	
Amanda Teyson	Reporter, NewsOnAir	LinkedIn, Facebook,	310
		Twitter, Google	
Sara McKibben	Reporter, NewsOnAir	LinkedIn, Facebook	Unknown
Joseph Nilsson	Founder, NewsOnAir	LinkedIn, Facebook	231
Jane Baker (Ava T. Foster)	Reporter, NewsOnAir	LinkedIn	30
Mary Cole	Recruiter for Defense	LinkedIn, Facebook,	500+
	Contractor	Google	
Berna Achando	Web Designer for Defense	LinkedIn, Facebook	151
	Contractor		
Jeann Maclkin	Systems Administrator for	LinkedIn, Facebook,	500+
	US Navy	Blogger, YouTube	
Alfred Nilsson	Talent Acquisition for Defense Contractor	LinkedIn, Facebook	Unknown
Josh Nilsson (Josh Furie)	IT Manager for Defense	LinkedIn, Facebook	130
	Contractor		
Dorotha Baasch	IT Analyst for Defense	LinkedIn, Facebook	Unknown
	Contractor		
Kenneth Babcock	CPA and Tax Advisor for	LinkedIn, Facebook,	Unknown
	Payment Processor	Google	
Donnie Eadense	Information Systems	LinkedIn	118
	Manager for Defense		
	Contractor		

Operational NEWSCASTER Personas

- All profiles are fictitious and use the pictures or information of real individuals, both public and otherwise.
 - Several personas used the names of real people while displaying alternative profile images, while others used images of real people, to include the moderately famous, paired with completely fabricated personas. For example, profiles purporting to be associated with the journalist Sandra Maler of Thompson Reuters used identifying profile images that clearly do not depict the known journalist. In addition, the Alfred

Nilsson persona uses images of Michael Mirisch, the founder of Los Angeles-based charity Hollywood Knights.

- Multiple personas used the photographs of others connected to the network. The fabricated NewsOnAir persona of Amanda Teyson used pictures of an Italian national reenacting a World War II combat cameraman. The Italian national is friends with the Adia Mitchell persona. Pictures used in the Dorotha Baash persona are taken from a profile who is friends with the persona of Jeann Maclkin.
- Several personas are linked via claims of employment by the fictitious journalism organization NewsOnAir. The NewsOnAir.org website uses news from other sources and credits it to the affiliated personas.



NewsOnAir.org website

- Still others indicate they are members of a Nilsson family, whose patriarch is ostensibly Joseph Nilsson, the persona who claims to have founded NewsOnAir.
- Additional ties include active social networking connections such as sharing and endorsements and the reuse of distinctive language in profiles. For instance, several profiles intimated they worked with targeted companies using the phrase, "I've some working between my company [company they claim to work for] and your company [targeted company]."

Targeting

The network was principally leveraged against US and Israeli targets in public and private sectors, though additional targeting included personnel from the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Though it is possible anyone connected to the network was compromised, deliberate attempts to connect with certain entities suggest an interest in political, military, diplomatic and technical intelligence. With the exception of personas that appear to be solely used to support the bonafides of others, the majority of personas purport to be journalists, members of the military or defense contractors.

 Several accounts intimated the targeting interest of the actors by creating profiles tailored to targeted organizations. In passages in several profiles, the actors defined a relationship between the company for which they claimed to work and the profile's reader, whom they referred to in the first person and whose company they identified. These profiles intimated an interest in US and Israeli defense contractors working in aerospace.



LinkedIn profiles indicated, in first person, which companies were specifically targeted

- Social networking accounts were found with extensive relationships to several current and former flag officers of the US military and senior government officials. The deliberate nature of their targeting was indicated by a long-term process of "friending" (or connecting their profiles to) people with whom the target is familiar or intimately related, building bona fides prior to ultimately friending the targeted person.
- Entities connected to the network included, but were not limited to:
 - Several current and former senior members of the military
 - Current and former senior foreign policy leaders, to includes those associated with nuclear non-proliferation and sanctions
 - Politicians and bureaucrats at the state and federal level with a particular concentration around the state of North Carolina
 - The US-Israel lobby
 - o Personnel from at least ten separate US and Israeli defense contractors
 - Several other accounts that have no apparent connection to geopolitics or organizations typically targeted in espionage activity
- Of note, a persona using the name Kendrick Babson is inconsistent with the aforementioned targeting motivation demonstrated by the choice of associated occupation. While others leverage military, DIB or journalist profiles, Kendrick Babson is purportedly an accountant working for a payment processor.

NewsOnAir.org, the Nilsson Family and Supporting Personas


Many of the personas claim to belong to the fictitious news organization NewsOnAir, which has its own Facebook and LinkedIn presence and a content-rich webpage setup at NewsOnAir.org designed to further legitimize the personas. Additionally, several of the personas are members of a fictitious "Nilsson" family, which includes NewsOnAir's so-called founder. We anticipate that there are several supporting personas that we have not yet identified that were created solely to legitimize other personas.

NewsOnAir.org is a website that features news stories updated several times weekly. The stories' content is not original and is taken from other sources such as CNN, Reuters and the BBC. Stories are frequently reposted with the bylines of the NewsOnAir personas and reposted to their social networking sites.



Reuters article, reposted one day later to NewsOnAir.org and credited to Amanda Teyson (her name is misspelled, a common mistake)

- After new stories are posted to the NewsOnAir site, links to the stories are shared through the NewsOnAir Twitter account "@NewsOnAir2."
- In addition to Twitter, NewsOnAir maintains a presence on LinkedIn and Facebook.
- In addition to news content, the NewsOnAir website offers apps for download. A weather application, a radio application and an application that reminds users to rest their eyes are offered through the site. The applications are modified to call back to a server controlled by the operators with user details, but no additional functionality was found.
- Several personas claim to be members of the Nilsson family or use the surname Nilsson. Joseph Nilsson, Alfred Nilsson and Josh Nilsson appear to be actively associated with direct targeting, while additional accounts with the Nilsson name appear to have been created to support the bonafides of others.



High Value Targets (HVT) and Malicious Links




In Facebook posts, personas intimated their fictitious familial relationships

Malicious Activity

Personas are linked through infrastructure to a number of credential collection sites, which we believe are being leveraged to gain access to accounts of targeted personnel. These sites, which at first glance appear to be the banal login pages for Yahoo, Google and Outlook Web Access, are linked to the NewsOnAir.org infrastructure and can be leveraged to gain covert access to sensitive accounts. Furthermore, other connected activity suggests additional, possibly nascent malicious capabilities that are being deployed or have previously been used.

- NewsOnAir.org is connected to credential phishing sites associated with domain com-login.mobi through links to eyeleo.com-login.mobi, offered as an App of the Week through the website.
 Other sites hosted on the domain include:
 - o youtube.com-login.mobi
 - o login.yahoo.com-login.mobi
 - o accounts.google.com-login.mobi
 - o m.login.live.com-login.mobi



NewsOnAir.Org: A Front News Agency

Security (1	tere exploration (
	This is a public or showed computer. This is a private computer
•	Use Culture web Access light The Light class provides from the last and it constrains have class the Light device the access a reason constraints and a constraint with anyone and the transmission extrange. If you are using a branew strate that before Explorer if is below, we are only use the Light class.
Denerijan Ferenal	1 mm
Ferreral.	Light

Credential collection site that resembles an Outlook Web Access portal

Several of the sites hosted on com-login.mobi are fictitious login sites used to surreptitiously collect unsuspecting visitors' credentials. The sites, which appear to be Outlook Web Access, Yahoo and Google login pages, have been leveraged in spear-phishing messages containing links that appear to be banal. The following link was used to send users to a credential collection page prior to redirecting them to a YouTube clip posted by the persona Jeann Maclkin:

http://youtube.comlogin.mobi/watch.aspx?v=uYvYJtzT8js&feature=youtu.be&f=g&h=http://youtu.be/kxXA 2_4Yv2A

- EyeLeo and at least two other apps offered for download through the NewsOnAir.org website are modified to send victim system information back to IP address 198.20.182.55. However, they do not appear to have any additional functionality.
- An embedded and broken iFrame on NewsOnAir.org pointed to the domain internetexplorers.org. The iFrame had an extraneous double quotation mark rendering the tag invalid.
- Multiple IRC malware samples were discovered that communicate with internetexplorers.org, updatexplore.com and mcaffeea.com, domains associated through registrants and other connections to NewsOnAir.org. All of the samples used the Persian term "parastoo" as a password. Of the IRC malware analyzed, samples were configured to communicate with four channels: "weather," "radio," "albert" and "tistani." Notably, two of the apps offered on the website are radio and weather related.
- iSIGHT Partners linked the following infrastructure to the activity:

Domain	IP Address
com-login.mobi	198.20.182.55
internetexplorers.org	213.152.173.147
updatexplore.com	70.168.71.240
mcafeea.com	184.82.202.248
mediaplayercodec.net	192.69.208.213
fun4us.us	192.69.204.57
	46.4.149.236

Domain	

199.26.84.143

IP Address

Iranian Origins


Targeting, social engineering ploys, adversary operational schedule and technical indicators suggest this activity has an Iranian origin.

 In 2011 and 2012, the Adia Mitchell Facebook account "friended" multiple accounts associated with conservative and North Carolina state politics. The persona proceeded to post awkward attempts to engage Facebook friends in conversation regarding Iranian diplomacy, culminating in the posting of an online poll in which friends of the account could participate.

Adia Mitchell asked a question. February 3, 2012 @ What's kind of sanction will leads to undermining the Iranian nation?			
Adia Mitchell December 31, 2011	Negotiations +1		
	Scientific +1		
joke of year:	Einancial		
Iranian will disrupt hormuz strait. he he	+ Add an answer		
Like - Share	Share		

Early Facebook activity included attempts to engage others on Iranian topics

- The distinctly Persian term "Parastoo" was used as a password for IRC malware associated through infrastructure to this activity. While the term is not distinct to any operator (such as the hacktivist Parastoo) it is distinctly Persian.
- NewsOnAir.org was previously registered in Tehran, and IP addresses used in infrastructure almost exclusively host Iranian content, suggesting hosting was obtained from an Iranian provider or intermediary.
- An analysis of Facebook activity indicates operators maintain regular hours that coincide with the professional workday in Tehran, Iran. Furthermore, activity drops off midday Thursday and resumes on Saturday, coinciding with the professional workweek.



Activity closely correlated with Tehran professional hours

Outlook and Implications

Cyber espionage activity with origins in Iran is not unprecedented. The Mahdi campaign, which largely focused on targets in Iran, the Gulf States and Israel, was attributed by iSIGHT Partners to an Iranian actor in 2012. Since then, iSIGHT Partners has tracked additional activity that appears to target Iran's dissident population and the US defense industrial base, such as activity attributed to members of the Ajax Security Team. International pressure and strategic uncertainty have almost certainly created an exigent need for intelligence in the country, which has been recently publicly implicated in several offensive cyber actions.

Given the covert nature of cyber espionage, its impacts are often difficult to forecast or measure; however, in this instance, we expect any accesses obtained by the NEWSCASTER network will be ultimately exploited for intelligence value. We infer, from our limited knowledge of NEWSCASTER targeting, that such intelligence could ultimately support the development of weapon systems, provide insight into the disposition of the US military or the US alliance with Israel, or impart an advantage in negotiations between Iran and the US, especially with regards to sanctions and proliferation issues. It is also possible that the compromise of such high-ranking and influential people could be used to access the senior levels of as-of-yet unidentified organizations in the US, Israel, and elsewhere. Furthermore, we surmise that access could be leveraged as reconnaissance-for-attack, supporting eventual disruptive or destructive attacks against targeted entities. Though there is no evidence indicating the NEWSCASTER network was created to support such activity, previous incidents publicly attributed to Iran, such as Operation Ababil and the attacks on Saudi Aramco underscore this possibility.

Methods used in this campaign are not novel, but they are brazen, especially when compared with short-term considerably less resource intensive efforts used by other cyber espionage actors. The personal nature of this campaign sets it apart from others and raises concerns that threats to organizations and personnel are not limited to enterprise systems or the office—social networking sites, personal accounts and even family members can be a vector for compromise by an adversary who compensates for sophistication with audacious, long-term actions.

Mitigation

We advise that victims and potential victims of this campaign consider the following course of actions:

- If you suspect you may be a victim:
 - Check for communications between enterprise system and known NEWSCASTER domains and IPs.
 - Check for communications to URLs associated with NEWSCASTER social network accounts.
- If you determine you are victim:
 - Immediately contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation at either your local FBI Cyber Task Force or FBI CYWATCH:

E-Mail: cywatch@ic.fbi.gov Voice: +1-855-292-3937

- Above all:
 - Never directly engage social network accounts.
 - o Never visit the Newsonair.org website or any other associated sites.
 - o Never disclose sensitive personally identifiable information on public social network sites.
 - Only "friend" or "accept" invites on social network sites from people who you know.
 - o Be wary of unsolicited links and confirm their veracity whenever possible.

Technical Annex

Analysis of IRC Bot

Key Points:

- Analysis was performed on a binary and was found to be an IRC bot.
- Command and control (C&C) servers associated with the bot family include internetexplorers.org, update.mcafeea.com and download.updatexplore.com.
 Channels the bot attempts to join include #tistani, #Weather, #albert and #Radio. Each channel uses the same password: "Parastoo."
- Victim usernames follow consistent naming convention, such "t___" followed by three digits.

Summary

iSIGHT Partners analyzed a malicious IRC bot. Several samples of the bot were found, all connecting to shared infrastructure and using the same password to join channels on the network. From past data, it is clear the IRC bot is intended for targeted operations, as the number of simultaneous users (8) allowed onto the IRC server at a given time is extremely small.

In our search, we uncovered samples that communicated with internetexplorers.org, update.macafeea.com and download.updateexplore.com. The channels the bots attempted to join varied, but the most commonly seen channel was #tistani. Others observed were #Weather, #Radio and #albert. Each used the same password for joining the channel "Parastoo."

Technical Details

Execution

When executed, the malware first writes a configuration file to a folder in the TEMP directory. This configuration file contains a version number, the channel to join, two possible IRC nicks to use, a date and an unknown number field. The IRC bot is then copied and executed; a batch file is also written that sets the IRC bot's persistence mechanisms via registry.

After a period of sleeping, the bot attempts to join the IRC server, join the channel and await further commands. Several of the strings in the bot are encrypted with a simple substitution cipher.

Some possible commands include:

- IDCC
- ISHLNV
- ISHLV
- ICMD
- IMSF
- IDSF
- IDWN
- IDWNEXE
- SETCUR
- EXE

- SETVER
- INI
- DRIVE
- VIEW
- REN
- MOVE
- COPY
- DEL
- MKDIR
- DIR

- EXEC
- HELp
- /start
- RESET
- KILL
- DELREG
- ISAC
- VER

The bot appears to be written to use a hard-coded boundary value for file transfers:

-----7b4a6d158c9

This string appears in multiple Chinese-language forums regarding coding for file transfers.

The malware also uses the mutex "afOneCopyMutex" to ensure only one instance of the malware runs at a time.

While the bot's full functionality was not tested, it appears capable of downloading remote files, file execution and searching infected victims' disks.

Files Dropped

After successful execution, the malware drops the following files to victims' systems:

- [TEMP]\System\Configuration.ini
 - IRC Bot configuration
- [ALLUSERSPROFILE]\WindowsUpdate\System\isass.exe

 IRC Bot
- [TEMP]\lpt1\driver.bat
 - Sets registry keys for malware persistence.

Persistence Method

While it was not observed during dynamic analysis, evidence indicates it is possible of maintaining persistence via the following registry key:

- Key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run\System
- Value: [ALLUSERSPROFILE]\WindowsUpdate\System\isass.exe

Network Communications

After successful installation/initialization, the malware proceeds to make the following callback to the C&C server over port (80/tcp):

Note: Victim to C&C in Red, C&C to Victim in Blue

USER AS_ # # :des NICK t_516 JOIN :#tistani Parastoo

Network Intelligence

Passive DNS

According to Passive DNS, other host names in the domain (updatexplore.com) include:

download.updatexplore.com

According to Passive DNS, other host names in the domain (mcafeea.com) include:

- downloadcenter.mcafeea.com
- update.mcafeea.com

According to Passive DNS, other host names in the domain (com-login.mobi) include:

- login.yahoo.com-login.mobi
- youtube.com-login.mobi
- www.com-login.mobi
- accounts.google.com-login.mobi
- eyeleo.com-login.mobi

Passive DNS was queried for the domain (internet explorers.org):

- 184.82.202.248
- 141.255.161.171
- 199.26.84.169

Passive DNS was queried for the domain (update.mcafeea.com):

- 192.69.204.57
- 46.4.149.236
- 213.152.173.147

Passive DNS was queried for the domain (download.updatexplore.com):

192.69.208.213

Passive DNS was queried for the following IP address (199.26.84.169):

- eyeleo.com-login.mobi
- internetexplorers.org

IP Information

```
IP Location:
              Switzerland Switzerland Zurich Private Layer Inc
ASN: Switzerland AS51852 PLI-AS Private Layer INC (registered Nov 15, 2010)
Resolve Host: customer9.orypt.info
IP Address:
               141.255.161.171
inetnum:
            141.255.160.0 - 141.255.167.255
            EU-PRIVATELAYER-20110706
netname:
descr:
          Private Layer INC
IP Location:
               United States United States
                                             Dallas Dfw Datacenter
      United States AS30496 COLO4 - Colo4, LLC (registered Oct 21, 2003)
ASN:
Resolve Host: win13-169.wsp.c4d.privatedns.biz
IP Address:
               199.26.84.169
Reverse IP:
                      websites use this address. (examples: 0000000.ir 1064.ir 1179.ir
               507
1446.ir)
```

NetRange: 199.26.84.0 - 199.26.87.255 NetName: DFW-DATACENTER

Domain Information

This section includes a standard Whois on the domain(s) directly related to the malware, but only includes the following data:

Domain Name:INTERNETEXPLORERS.ORG Created On:18-Aug-2012 09:38:08 UTC Last Updated On:20-Dec-2013 13:27:58 UTC Expiration Date:18-Aug-2014 09:38:08 UTC Sponsoring Registrar:Realtime Register B.V. (R1336-LROR) Status: CLIENT TRANSFER PROHIBITED Registrant ID:t96dohz5wb Registrant Name: john cortez **Registrant Organization:LLC** Registrant Street1:Lockheed Blvd **Registrant Street2: Registrant Street3: Registrant City:palm Registrant State/Province:California** Registrant Postal Code:92274 **Registrant Country:US** Registrant Phone:+001.4084733000 **Registrant Phone Ext.: Registrant FAX: Registrant FAX Ext.:** Registrant E-mail:john-cortez@llc.com

Domain Name:updatexplore.com Name Server:ns03.hostcontrol.org Name Server:ns02.hostcontrol.com Name Server:ns01.hostcontrol.com Created On:2012-11-29 10:34:03.0 Last Updated On:2014-01-13 11:34:03.0 Expiration Date:2014-11-29 11:34:03.0 Sponsoring Registrar: REALTIME REGISTER B.V. Reseller:Realtime Register B.V. Status:CLIENT_TRANSFER_PROHIBITED Status:REDEMPTION_PERIOD Status:CLIENT HOLD Status: PENDING DELETE Registrant ID:RC_22222159 Registrant Name: john cortez **Registrant Organization:LLC** Registrant Street1:Lockheed Blvd **Registrant City:palm Registrant State:California** Registrant Postal Code:92274

Registrant Country:US Registrant Phone:+001.4084733000 Registrant Fax: Registrant E-mail:john-cortez@llc.com

Domain Name:mcafeea.com Name Server:ns03.hostcontrol.org Name Server:ns02.hostcontrol.com Name Server:ns01.hostcontrol.com Created On:2012-12-24 12:39:40.0 Last Updated On:2013-12-26 00:08:02.0 Expiration Date:2014-12-24 13:39:40.0 Sponsoring Registrar:REALTIME REGISTER B.V. Reseller:Realtime Register B.V. Status:CLIENT_TRANSFER_PROHIBITED Status:CLIENT HOLD Status:OK Status:AUTO RENEW PERIOD Registrant ID:RC_22222159 Registrant Name: john cortez **Registrant Organization:LLC** Registrant Street1:Lockheed Blvd **Registrant City:palm Registrant State:California** Registrant Postal Code:92274 **Registrant Country:US** Registrant Phone:+001.4084733000 **Registrant Fax:** Registrant E-mail:john-cortez@llc.com

Related Samples

- b08e84277e0f2221f187dd97273ee643
 - o download.updatexplore.com.
 - o internetexplorers.org
 - o update.mcafeea.com
 - o #albert
- f5d4f59b2cb6a98bfeadf595a29f9ca2
 - o update.mcafeea.com
 - o **#Weather**
 - 994a376df0f799725fd609e125ea8efe
 - o update.mcafeea.com
- c30d0f1b6f8c25ec49bbca32beb6513b
 - o mcafeea.com
 - o update.mcafeea.com
 - o #Radio
- 7224d82bcbed0663afd1a296c587f6bf
 - o Internetexplorers.org
 - o **#tistani**
- faeb660d03beec1abfb960b1bfab2211
 - o Internetexplorers.org
 - o #tistani
- baa6d4d60d77dc120cf545df5d755eaf
 - o internetexplorers.org
 - o #tistani
- dfa72a90fdaf914756cd1f860a45f35b
 - o internetexplorers.org
 - o #tistani
- 4e7a9a58ceb07d111fd57174b9fc29e5
 - o Internetexplorers.org
 - o **#tistani**
 - b2e6de2255946219e02872e3fc330e60
 - o Data profiling tool
 - From http://eyeleo.com-login.mobi/EyeLeo_Installer_1.1.exe
 - o 198.20.182.55
- 0c66db47cae6950e78a76fcacc7f5b8b
 - o Data profiling tool
 - From http://newsonair.org/application/RadioTunaSetup1.exe
 - o **198.20.182.55**
- 4f064b3a9b230e18cbd3745a49592d26
 - Data profiling tool
 - From http://newsonair.org/application/weathersp3_StubInstaller.exe
 - o **198.20.182.55**

File Information

Name: driver.bat Identifier: attacker Extension: bat Type: ASCII text, with no line terminators Size: 176 Packer: None detected MD5sum: d1d457876a373b022a6afca718c71cab Sha1: fdc4b6ba87ab8349490878a7a97eb60bce813442 Sha256: 8491c741674ca0c73dbf49d16386722d8cf21569bb85d766f562ee6083347ea3 Fuzzy: 3:iV5t/NyfrZfyM1K7eB/k+UZaYW52gidJfCdlH1MARm5IDfAuCHcHZIKDn:zH1jhRUTgidJqdEARm5IDezDn MIME: text/plain Compiled: NA Description: Installs persistence for bot.

Name: Isass.exe Identifier: attacker Extension: exe Type: PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit Size: 192512 Packer: ['Armadillo v1.71'] MD5sum: de1fbaf90f18a382289e996590d0b76d Sha1: 4daa50171005c12cc371e80db7569b781917e2b2 Sha256: e72c0330360e4dcffb0771ca167274279cbadc7742b2dc70ffcbfc471ef62bf6 Fuzzy: 3072:nkXhoQH9FeIaAH2vBWIdaUXRrk5B2Dlcgclpjgu/W/8/0sOKEtA:qikIUoBkGu7XX/h/2A MIME: application/octet-stream Compiled: 2012-08-27 01:42:15 Description: IRC Bot

Name: Configurations.ini Identifier: attacker Extension: ini Type: ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators Size: 98 Packer: None detected MD5sum: 90af5ea2c44cd57f983af552a6097b41 Sha1: a7017bc6586a8de2d42a41ec072be0c5fd236607 Sha256: dbd4fe1bd942b77376fff1b3500606bdcaa725a2dccfc5d49ed4560af816bfe6 Fuzzy: 3:3qyATWGxU8rWPPkvejyVc5DVyIXxov:avy8rVvejyQpw MIME: text/plain Compiled: NA Description: Configuration file for the bot.