# new targeted attacks leveraging zero-day exploit

By GReAT on October 16, 2017. 2:28 pm

More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

# Introduction

Kaspersky Lab has always worked closely with vendors to protect users. As soon as we find new vulnerabilities we immediately inform the vendor in a responsible manner and provide all the details required for a fix.

On October 10, 2017, Kaspersky Lab's advanced exploit prevention systems identified a new Adobe Flash zero day exploit used in the wild against our customers. The exploit was delivered through a Microsoft Office document and the final payload was the latest version of FinSpy malware. We have reported the bug to Adobe who assigned it CVE-2017-11292 and released a patch earlier today:

### Vulnerability details

Vulnerability Category	Vulnerability Impact	Severity	CVE Number				
Type Confusion	Remote Code Execution	Critical	CVE-2017-11292				

### Acknowledgments

Adobe would like to thank Anton Ivanov of Kaspersky Labs for reporting this issue and for working with Adobe to help protect our customers.

So far only one attack has been observed in our customer base, leading us to believe the number of attacks are minimal and highly targeted.

Analysis of the payload allowed us to confidently link this attack to an actor we track as "BlackOasis". We are also highly confident that BlackOasis was also responsible for another zero day exploit (CVE-2017-8759) discovered by FireEye in September 2017. The FinSpy payload used in the current attacks (CVE-2017-11292) shares the same command and control (C2) server as the payload used with CVE-2017-8759 uncovered by FireEye.


### **BlackOasis Background**

We first became aware of BlackOasis' activities in May 2016, while investigating another Adobe Flash zero day. On May 10, 2016, Adobe warned of a vulnerability (CVE-2016-4117) affecting Flash Player 21.0.0.226 and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh, Linux, and Chrome OS. The vulnerability was actively being exploited in the wild.

Kaspersky Lab was able to identify a sample exploiting this vulnerability that was uploaded to a multi scanner system on May 8, 2016. The sample, in the form of an RTF document, exploited CVE-2016-4117 to download and install a program from a remote C&C server. Although the exact payload of the attack was no longer in the C&C, the same server was hosting multiple FinSpy installation packages.

Leveraging data from Kaspersky Security Network, we identified two other similar exploit chains used by BlackOasis in June 2015 which were zero days at the time. Those include CVE-2015-5119 and CVE-2016-0984, which were patched in July 2015 and February 2016 respectively. These exploit chains also delivered FinSpy installation packages.

Since the discovery of BlackOasis' exploitation network, we've been tracking this threat actor with the purpose of better understanding their operations and targeting and have seen a couple dozen new attacks. Some lure documents used in these attacks are shown below:





Decoy documents used in BlackOasis attacks

To summarize, we have seen BlackOasis utilizing at least five zero days since June 2015:

- CVE-2015-5119 June 2015
- CVE-2016-0984 June 2015
- CVE-2016-4117 May 2016
- CVE-2017-8759 Sept 2017
- CVE-2017-11292 Oct 2017

### Attacks Leveraging CVE-2017-11292

The attack begins with the delivery of an Office document, presumably in this instance via e-mail. Embedded within the document is an ActiveX object which contains the Flash exploit.

```
./[Content_Types].xml
              ./_rels
              ./_rels/.rels
              ./docProps
              ./docProps/app.xml
              ./docProps/core.xml
              . /word
              ./word/_rels
              ./word/_rels/document.xml.rels
              ./word/_rels/header1.xml.rels
              ./word/activeX
              ./word/activeX/_rels
              ./word/activeX/_rels/activeX1.xml.rels
              ./word/activeX/activeX1.bin
              ./word/activeX/activeX1.xml
              ./word/document.xml
              ./word/endnotes.xml
              ./word/fontTable.xml
              ./word/footnotes.xml
              ./word/header1.xml
              ./word/media
              ./word/media/image1.png
              ./word/settings.xml
              ./word/styles.xml
              ./word/stylesWithEffects.xml
              ./word/theme
              ./word/theme/theme1.xml
              ./word/webSettings.xml
          0000C510:
0000C520: 66 55 03 42-00 00 46 57-53 20 03 42-00 00 48 01 fU♥B FWS ♥B
0000C530: B8 00 64 00-00 1E 01 00-44 11 19 00-00 00 7F 13 j d ▲⊕ D◀↓
0000C540: CB 01 00 00-3C 72 64 66-3A 52 44 46-20 78 6D 6C πΘ <rdf:RDF xml
0000C550: 6E 73 3A 72-64 66 3D 27-68 74 74 70-3A 2F 2F 77 ns:rdf='http://w
0000C550: 77 77 2E 77-33 2E 6F 72-67 2F 31 39-39 39 2F 30 ww.w3.org/1999/0
0000C570: 32 2F 32 32-2D 72 64 66-2D 73 79 6E-74 61 78 2D 2/22-rdf-syntax-
0000C580: 6E 73 23 27-3E 3C 72 64-66 3A 44 65-73 63 72 69 ns#'><rdf:Descri
0000C590: 70 74 69 6F-6E 20 72 64-66 3A 61 62-6F 75 74 3D
                                                             ption rdf:about=
0000C5A0: 27 27 20 78-6D 6C 6E 73-3A 64 63 3D-27 68 74 74
                                                              '' xmlns:dc='htt
0000C5B0: 70 3A 2F 2F-70 75 72 6C-2E 6F 72 67-2F 64 63 2F p://purl.org/dc/
         65 6C 65 6D-65 6E 74 73-2F 31 2E 31-27 3E 3C 64 elements/1.1'><d
0000C5C0:
          63 3A 66 6F-72 6D 61 74-3E 61 70 70-6C 69 63 61 c:format>applica
```

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tion/x-shockwave

-flash</dc:forma

t><dc:title>Adob

Flash object in the .docx file, stored in uncompressed format

74 69 6F 6E-2F 78 2D 73-68 6F 63 6B-77 61 76 65

74 3E 3C 64-63 3A 74 69-74 6C 65 3E-41 64 6F 62

0000C5F0: 2D 66 6C 61-73 68 3C 2F-64 63 3A 66-6F 72 6D 61

0000C5D0:

0000C5E0:

00000600:

The Flash object contains an ActionScript which is responsible for extracting the exploit using a custom packer seen in other FinSpy exploits.



Unpacking routine for SWF exploit

The exploit is a memory corruption vulnerability that exists in the "com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore.BufferControlParameters" class. If the exploit is successful, it will gain arbitrary read / write operations within memory, thus allowing it to execute a second stage shellcode.

The first stage shellcode contains an interesting NOP sled with alternative instructions, which was most likely designed in such a way to avoid detection by antivirus products looking for large NOP blocks inside flash files:

00000000:	90 <mark>90</mark>	nop	
00000002:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
0000003:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
00000004:	9090	nop	
0000006:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
00000007:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
0000008:	9090	nop	
000000A:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
000000B:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
0000000C:	9090	nop	
000000E:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
000000F:	91	xchg	ecx,eax
0000010:	81E086FFFAF2	and	eax,0F2FAFF86 ;'≥∙å'
0000016:	B964010000	mov	ecx,000000164 ;' ⊜d'
000001B:	29CC	sub	esp,ecx
000001D:	33D2	xor	edx,edx
000001F:	87E7	xchg	edi,esp
0000021:	89FC	mov	esp,edi
0000023:	81E0E1A3D9A3	1and	eax,0A3D9A3E1 ;'ú <sup>l</sup> úß'

NOP sled composed of 0x90 and 0x91 opcodes

The main purpose of the initial shellcode is to download second stage shellcode from hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/5uzosoff0u.iaf.

00000000:	C1	ED	00	81-EC	30	01	00-00	33	C9	89-E7	87	E4	88	⊥ <sub>э Бь0© З<sub>ГГ</sub>ЙчЗфИ</sub>
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00000020:	00	00	33	D2-68	31	38	B5-77	87	FF	5B-02	14	0F	00	3πh18=w3 [0¶α
00000030:	DA 🕔	C1	СВ	08-53	8A	10	0F-81	C8	56	F0-1B	14	86	10	ŗ <sup>⊥</sup> <mark>ਜ</mark> •SK∟¢Б <sup>Ľ</sup> VЁ́←ĴЖ∟
00000040:	3A 🛛	88	10	0F-F6	D9	80	E9-01	F6	D9	75-DC	EB	01	1E	: И∟ѻЎ <sup>⅃</sup> Ащ⊚Ў <sup>⅃</sup> и—ы⊚▲
00000050:	<b>E8</b>	1B	00	00-00	A3	C7	DE-04	63	FF	A3-4A	28	AF	D1	ш← г <mark> </mark> ♦сг](п <del>т</del>
00000060:	AD 🛛	68	BØ	21-F9	D4	E8	50-6B	79	DC	CC-32	F2	5B	67	нh
00000070:	5E 🛛	83	EE	A6-BA	00	00	00-00	29	С9	C7-47	CC	AB	08	^Гюж ) 🗗 G л •
00000080:	00	00	33	DB-F6	DA	80	EA-01	F6	DA	02-0C	17	8A	1C	З <mark>Ў</mark> ГАъ⊕Ў <sub>Г</sub> ⊕♀҄£К∟
00000090:	17	86	10	39-88	10	17	02-1C	0F	8A	1C-1F	30	1E	83	<b>⋬Ж∟</b> 9И∟⋬ <b>Ө</b> ∟≎К∟ <b>∀</b> 0▲Г
000000A0:	C6 (	01	FF	4F-CC	74	08	EB-04	2F	7E	C7-7D	EB	D5	AC	-® 0-t <mark>•</mark> ы∳/~-}ыгм
000000B0:	<b>B4</b> (	90	D5	50-57	D8	ЗA	8E-DE	F2	A0	AF-C5	21	73	74	P <sub>F</sub> PW <b>+</b> :0 €an+!st
00000000:	56	E5	20	E4-9D	80	FD	A7-8D	C6	<b>4</b> C	AD-07	48	10	91	Vх фЭА¤зН≓Lн∙н∟с
000000D0:	43	B1	2C	EE-05	20	15	2D-3E	B5	2F	A8-41	7F	11	BD	С┋,ю╇_§-≻╡∕иА⋳◄┚
000000E0:	40 ·		59	F2-B6	<b>4</b> C			4E		9E-DC	85	51	85	@KYE <mark>∥</mark> Ly <b>▼</b> ♠N`Ю <mark>_</mark> EQE
000000F0:	4D	63	7E	BB-A5	68	18	00-1D	8C	FC	FA-DF	94	4E	AB	Мс~ <sub>¶</sub> eh↑
00000100:	F1			D5-8C			46-5F	B1		06-0A	CB	FA	DB	ёыЕ _М98F₩ <b>А©</b> , г
00000110:	51		_		6C		3D-26	68		C2-EF	88	15	4D	Q3 <b> - 4</b> l · =&hk <sub>т</sub> яИ§М
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00000130:				76-F6								~~		∖бю∨Ў=Хр`Б►И@xm
00000140:	14	~~	0A		23		69-83	97			05		9C	9¦æ <sub>ī</sub> G#∙iГЧ <sup>∐</sup> ♠Ш♀
00000150:			95	84-E4						11-A2				҉҄҄҄ <sup>Д</sup> 2ХДфЗї№ѧ9з⊲вн♥F
00000160:			67							B0-B8		32		ηдg <sub>1</sub> е <sup>且</sup> 0оП <sup>L</sup> ►ຶ <sub>1</sub> л21
00000170:		ED	6F	0C-40	91				7B	98-BB		51		√эо♀@СаЁн5{Ш <sub>Л</sub> Qў
00000180:		7D	5C				6F-E9	- C	12			2A		ы}∖⋕х`юощ╘ѕ⊎Уй*⊎
00000190:		53	2F					C4			20			eS/iЗо <sub>Т</sub> Ёы— <sup>∥</sup> &‼,ҮД
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000001B0:		~~	1E				2C-7D			9F-2C		87		лh <b>▲\<sup>⊥</sup>vH,}√</b> [Я,ТЗ⊠
000001C0:	68		ØD					FA				37		h <mark>_</mark> ♪b <mark>_</mark> 4r`&·⊜↔;V7Ю
000001D0:			06 06	83-40			72-20	• ~		4D-B7	90	A0	_	<sup>L</sup> [♠Г@°·r,№ЧМ <sub>П</sub> Ра]
000001E0:	80	DD	20	27-2D	21	FC	86-3F	Α/	2A	BE-76	DA	AA	02	A <mark>,'-!№Ж?з*<sup>」</sup>∨_</mark> к <mark>®</mark>

The second stage shellcode will then perform the following actions:

- 1. Download the final payload (FinSpy) from
  - hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/mo.exe
- 2. Download a lure document to display to the victim from the same IP
- 3. Execute the payload and display the lure document

### Payload – mo.exe

As mentioned earlier, the "mo.exe" payload (MD5:

4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a) is the newest version of Gamma International's FinSpy malware, typically sold to nation states and other law enforcement agencies to use in lawful surveillance operations. This newer variant has made it especially difficult for researchers to analyze the malware due to many added anti-analysis techniques, to include a custom packer and virtual machine to execute code.

The PCODE of the virtual machine is packed with the aplib packer.



#### Part of packed VM PCODE

After unpacking, the PCODE it will look like the following:

00000000:	<b>5D 14 5A 00-03 5</b>	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	I¶Z ♥Үн×↔Үн×↔Үн×
00000010:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-3E AO 5A	00-1F 59 AD 2A	+¥н*+¥н*>аZ ▼Yн*
00000020:	18 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	<u>↑¥нו¥нו¥нו¥н×</u>
00000030:	43 AO 5A 00-02 5	AD 2A-15 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	СаZ СҮн*§Үн*"Үн*
00000040:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-4C AO 5A	00-14 59 AD 2A	+чн×+чн×LaZ ¶чн×
00000050:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	··YH*··YH*·YH*·YH*
00000060:	4F AO 5A 00-12 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	ОаZ \$Yн**Yн**Yн*
00000070:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-61 14 5A	00-06 5F AD 2A	+Чн*+Чн*а¶Z ♠ н*
00000080:	DA 59 7A 2B-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	┎Ϋᡓᢣ᠋ᠬᠮнӿ┉ᠮнӿ┉ᠮнӿ
00000090:	68 14 5A 00-06 5	AC 2A-A5 59 5D	2B-1D 59 AD 2A	ĥ¶Z <b>≜∖</b> м≭eY]++Yн≭
000000A0:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-6C 14 5A	00-06 58 AD 2A	<i></i> ₩Үн×₩Үн×1¶Z <b>Ф</b> Хн×
000000BO:	D4 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	EYH***YH**YH**YH*
000000CO:	6D 14 5A 00-06 5	AD 2A-DF 5D AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	м¶Z ФZн×■]н×++Ун×
000000D0:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 28-75 14 5A	00-06 58 AD 2A	+Ун*+Ун*u¶Z ФХн*
000000E0:	7D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	<u>}ҮнжөҮнжөҮнжөҮнж</u>
000000F0:	7E 14 5A 00-06 5	3 AD 2A-2E 90 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	~ЧZ Ф[н*.Рн*+Ун*
00000100:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-85 14 5A	00-06 5F AD 2A	₩¥н₩₩¥н₩Е¶Ζ ♠_нж
00000110:	9C BO AD AD-98 D	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	Ь∭ннШ нж∾Үнж⇔Үнж
00000120:	86 14 5A 00-10 5	AD 2A-1C 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	Ж¶Z ▶Үнж∟ҮнжөҮнж
00000130:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-55 AO 5A	00-0E 59 AD 2A	+чн×+чн×UaZ Лчн×
00000140:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	<del></del> ₩¥H <del>×</del> ₩¥H <del>×</del> ₩¥H <del>×</del> ₩¥H <del>×</del>
00000150:	8F 14 5A 00-06 5	7 AD 2A-9C A8 83	36-1F 44 AD 2A	П¶Zн×БиГб▼Dн×
00000160:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-90 14 5A	00-10 59 AD 2A	+Yн×+Yн×P¶Z ▶Yн×
00000170:	1C 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	∟YH <del>×</del> ₩YH <del>×</del> ₩YH <del>×</del> ₩YH <del>×</del>
00000180:	57 AO 5A 00-0E 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	WaZ ЛҮн*•Үн*•Үн*
00000190:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-91 14 5A	00-06 5F AD 2A	•Чн*•Чн*С¶Z Ф_н*
000001AO:	9C 98 EC 27-F0 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	ЬШь́́Е́∪н <del>×</del> ⇔Үн <del>×</del> ⇔Үн×
000001B0:	95 14 5A 00-10 5	AD 2A-1C 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	Х¶ℤ ▶Үнж∟ҮнжөҮнж
000001CO:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-5E AO 5A	00-0E 59 AD 2A	+Чн*+Чн*^аZ ЛЧн*
000001D0:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5		2A-1D 59 AD 2A	<del></del> ₩¥H <del>×</del> ₩¥H <del>×</del> ₩¥H <del>×</del> ₩¥H <del>×</del>
000001E0:	9A 14 5A 00-06 5		D0-E9 5C AD 2A	Ъ¶Zн+с∭з <sup>⊥1</sup> щ∖н+:
000001F0:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-A3 14 5A	00-10 59 AD 2A	++Ун×++Ун×г¶Z ▶Ун×
00000200:	1C 59 AD 2A-1D 5	AD 2A-1D 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	└ŸH <del>×</del> ┅ŸH <del>×</del> ┅ŸH <del>×</del> ┅ŸH <del>×</del>
00000210:	67 AO 5A 00-OE 5		2A-1D 59 AD 2A	gaZ ЛҮн*•Үн*•Үн*
00000220:	1D 59 AD 2A-1D 5		00-10 59 AD 2A	++Ун×++Ун×к¶Z ▶Ун×
00000230:	19 59 AD 2A-1D 5		2A-1D 59 AD 2A	↓YH <del>×</del> ↔YH <del>×</del> ↔YH <del>×</del> ↔YH×
00000240:	6F AO 5A 00-12 5	AD 2A-1B 59 AD	2A-1D 59 AD 2A	оаZ \$Yн**Yн**Yн*

#### Unpacked PCODE

After unpacking the virtual machine PCODE is then decrypted:

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00000010:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-23	F9	F7	28-02	00	00	00		# • ij <b>×</b> 🙂
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00000040:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-51	F9	F7	28-09	00	00	00	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Q-0*0
00000050:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00		
00000060:	52	F9	F7	2A-0F	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	R • ÿ×¢	
00000070:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-7C	4D	F7	2A-1B	06	00	00	100 <b>- 1</b> 00 - 100	lMÿ <del>×∈</del> ♠
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00000100:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-98	<b>4D</b>	F7	2A-1B	06	00	00		WMÿ₩€♠
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00000130:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00 - 48	F9	F7	28-13	00	00	00		H+ğ*‼
00000140:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00		
00000150:	92	<b>4D</b>	F7	2A-1B	06	00	00 - 81	<b>F1</b>	<b>2E</b>	1C-02	1D	00	00	TMÿ×←♠	Бё. <b>⊢</b> ₿↔
00000160:	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-8D	<b>4D</b>	F7	2A-0D	00	00	00		HMÿ₩₽
00000170:	01	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	8	
00000180:	40	F9	F7	2A-13	00	00	00 - 00	00	00	00 - 00	00	00	00	J +ÿ*‼	

#### Decrypted VM PCODE

The custom virtual machine supports a total of 34 instructions:

Ød	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
13	00	00	00	<u>0</u> 0	aa	aa	ØØ	aa	ØØ	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
<b>1</b> b	06	00	00	81	f1	2e	1c	02	1d	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	VM opcode with
Ød	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	longth
13	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	length
1b	06	00	00	81	c1	41	Ød	ed	0c	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Ød	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	VM instruction
13	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
<b>1</b> b	06	00	00	81	e9	0a	fa	f4	05	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	parameter
Ød	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
13	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

#### Example of parsed PCODE

In this example, the "1b" instruction is responsible for executing native code that is specified in parameter field.

Once the payload is successfully executed, it will proceed to copy files to the following locations:

- C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\AdapterTroubleshooter.exe
- C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\15b937.cab
- C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\install.cab
- C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\msvcr90.dll
- C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\d3d9.dll

The "AdapterTroubleshooter.exe" file is a legitimate binary which is leveraged to use the famous DLL search order hijacking technique. The "d3d9.dll" file is malicious and is loaded into memory by the legit binary upon execution. Once loaded, the DLL will then inject FinSpy into the Winlogon process.

%s	%02d%02d	UTC%s %s	??????????????????????????????????????	*%s %d	N/A Au	dio Recor	ding We	bCam Rec	ording	Screens	shot Rec
Rec	ording	Skype F	ile Tran	sfer Rec	ording	Changed	File Re	cording	Deleted	File Red	cording
Acce	ssed Fil	e Record	ing Fore	nsics Re	cording	VoIP File	e Record	ing Mous	eClicks	File Reco	ording
Rec	ording E	mail Fil	e Record	ing W	IFI File	Recordin	ng Remov	ableMedi	a File R	ecording	Passv
C.da	t .\%02X	.dat gd	iplus.dl	1 shell3	2dll	shell32	2.dll fi	rmware.b	in	Global	\Debug.
1	System\	CurrentC	ontrolSe	t\Servic	es\%s	%s∖Enum	%s\Secu	rity %s∖	Paramete	rs	\\.\%c:
nit*	.* %s\u	serenv*.	*	Software	\Microso	ft\Window	vs\Curre	ntVersio	n\Run 👘	rundll32	\ .1nk
ogg	.wma	.mp3	.wmv	.mp4	.ogv	.mpeg	.mpg	.avi	.bz2	.arj	.rar
peg	.jpg	.pdf	.rtf	.otp	.odp	.ots	.ods	.ott	.odt	.xsn	.xsf
sm	.potx	.potm	.ppt	.ost	.one	.gsa	.grv	.gfs	.dotx	.dotm	.docx

#### Part of injected code in winlogon process

The payload calls out to three C2 servers for further control and exfiltration of data. We have observed two of them used in the past with other FinSpy payloads. Most recently one of these C2 servers was used together with CVE-2017-8759 in the attacks reported by FireEye in September 2017. These IPs and other previous samples tie closely to the BlackOasis APT cluster of FinSpy activity.

# **Targeting and Victims**

BlackOasis' interests span a wide gamut of figures involved in Middle Eastern politics and verticals disproportionately relevant to the region. This includes prominent figures in the United Nations, opposition bloggers and activists, and regional news correspondents. During 2016, we observed a heavy interest in Angola, exemplified by lure documents indicating targets with suspected ties to oil, money laundering, and other illicit activities. There is also an interest in international activists and think tanks.

Victims of BlackOasis have been observed in the following countries: Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom and Angola.

### Conclusions

We estimate that the attack on HackingTeam in mid-2015 left a gap on the market for surveillance tools, which is now being filled by other companies. One of these is Gamma International with their FinFisher suite

of tools. Although Gamma International itself was hacked by Phineas Fisher in 2014, the breach was not as serious as it was in the case of HackingTeam. Additionally, Gamma had two years to recover from the attack and pick up the pace.

We believe the number of attacks relying on FinFisher software, supported by zero day exploits such as the ones described here will continue to grow.

What does it mean for everyone and how to defend against such attacks, including zero-day exploits?

For CVE-2017-11292 and other similar vulnerabilities, one can use the killbit for Flash within their organizations to disable it in any applications that respect it. Unfortunately, doing this system-wide is not easily done, as Flash objects can be loaded in applications that potentially do not follow the killbit. Additionally, this may break any other necessary resources that rely on Flash and of course, it will not protect against exploits for other third party software.

Deploying a multi-layered approach including access policies, anti-virus, network monitoring and whitelisting can help ensure customers are protected against threats such as this. Users of Kaspersky products are protected as well against this threat by one of the following detections:

- PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic
- HEUR:Exploit.SWF.Generic
- HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic

More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com

# Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the Adobe Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) for working with us to identify and patch this vulnerability.

# References

1. Adobe Bulletin https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb17-32.html

# Indicators of compromise

#### 4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a 89.45.67[.]107

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Ryan Posted on October 16, 2017. 11:54 pm

Does EMET block the flash exploit?

REPLY



#### Faron Faulk

Posted on October 17, 2017. 5:04 pm

fixed

https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/securityguidance/advisory/ADV170018

REPLY