
## welivesecurity eser



**Y** 

We spotted this malware campaign when our systems marked several files as suspicious.





(G+)

Having confirmed the file's malicious nature, we notified D-Link, who launched their own investigation into the matter. As a result, the compromised digital certificate was revoked by D-Link on July 3, 2018.




Figure 1. The D-Link Corporation code signing certificate used to sign malware

### The malware

Our analysis identified two different malware families that were misusing the stolen certificate

– the Plead malware, a remotely controlled backdoor, and a related password stealer component. Recently, the JPCERT published a thorough analysis of the Plead backdoor, which, according to Trend Micro, is used by the cyberespionage group BlackTech.




Figure 2. The Changing Information Technology Inc. code signing certificate used to sign malware

Along with the Plead samples signed with the D-Link certificate, ESET researchers have also identified samples signed using a certificate belonging to a Taiwanese security company named Changing Information Technology Inc.

Despite the fact that the Changing Information Technology Inc. certificate was revoked on July 4, 2017, the BlackTech group is still using it to sign their malicious tools.

The ability to compromise several Taiwan-based technology companies and reuse their codesigning certificates in future attacks shows that this group is highly skilled and focused on that region.

The signed Plead malware samples are highly obfuscated with junk code, but the purpose of the malware is similar in all samples: it downloads from a remote server or opens from the local disk a small encrypted binary blob. This binary blob contains encrypted shellcode, which downloads the final Plead backdoor module.

```
.text:00401C8B
                   call
                            dummy func 1
                            40h ; '@'
.text:00401C90
                   push
                                                  DWORD
                                                  DWORD
.text:00401C92
                   push
                            1000h
                                                  DWORD
.text:00401C97
                   push
                            500000h
                                                  DWORD
.text:00401C9C
                   push
                            edi
                   call
                            kernel32 GetCurrentProcess
.text:00401C9D
.text:00401CA3
                   push
                            eax
                                                ; DWORD
.text:00401CA4
                   call.
                            kernel32 VirtualAllocEx
.text:00401CAA
                   mov
                            edi, eax
                   test
                            edi, edi
.text:00401CAC
                   įΖ
                            1oc 401D9B
.text:00401CAE
                   call
                            dummy func 1
.text:00401CB4
                                               ; Format
.text:00401CB9
                   push
                            esi
                   call
                            ebx ; printf
.text:00401CBA
.text:00401CBC
                   pop
                            ecx
                            dummy func 1
.text:00401CBD
                   call
.text:00401CC2
                   call
                            dummy func 3
                   call
                            dummy func 1
.text:00401CC7
                            esi
                                                : Format
.text:00401CCC
                   push
                            [ebp+lpString2], edi
.text:00401CCD
                   mov
.text:00401CD0
                   call
                            ebx ; printf
.text:00401CD2
                   call
                            dummy func 1
.text:00401CD7
                   call
                            dummy func 1
                   call
                            dummy func 2
.text:00401CDC
                   call
                            dummy func 1
.text:00401CE1
                   call
                            dummy func 1
.text:00401CE6
                   call
                            dummy func 2
.text:00401CEB
                   call
                            dummy func 3
.text:00401CF0
                            [ebp+var 4]
                                               ; Size
.text:00401CF5
                   push
                            [ebp+Src]
                                               ; Src
.text:00401CF8
                   push
.text:00401CFB
                   push
                            edi
                                                ; Dst
.text:00401CFC
                   call
                            memcpy
```

Figure 3. Obfuscated code of the Plead malware

The password stealer tool is used to collect saved passwords from the following applications:

Google Chrome

Microsoft Internet ExplorerMicrosoft OutlookMozilla Firefox

### Why steal digital certificates?

Misusing digital certificates is one of the many ways cybercriminals try to mask their malicious intentions – as the stolen certificates let malware appear like legitimate applications, the malware has a greater chance of sneaking past security measures without raising suspicion.

Probably the most infamous malware known to have used several stolen digital certificates is the Stuxnet worm, discovered in 2010 and the malware behind the very first cyberattack to target critical infrastructure. Stuxnet used digital certificates stolen from RealTek and one from JMicron, two well-known technology companies based in Taiwan.

However, the tactic is not exclusive to high-profile incidents like Stuxnet, as evidenced by this recent discovery.

#### loCs

# **ESET detection names** Win32/PSW.Agent.OES trojan Win32/Plead.L trojan Win32/Plead.S trojan Win32/Plead.T trojan Win32/Plead.U trojan Win32/Plead.V trojan Win32/Plead.X trojan Win32/Plead.Y trojan Win32/Plead.Z trojan

| Unsigned samples (SHA-1)   |
|--|
| 80AE7B26AC04C93AD693A2D816E8742B906CC0E3                         |
| 62A693F5E4F92CCB5A2821239EFBE5BD792A46CD                         |
| B01D8501F1EEAF423AA1C14FCC816FAB81AC8ED8                         |
| 11A5D1A965A3E1391E840B11705FFC02759618F8                         |
| 239786038B9619F9C22401B110CF0AF433E0CEAD                         |
|  |
| Signed samples (SHA-1)   |
| Signed samples (SHA-1)  1DB4650A89BC7C810953160C6E41A36547E8CF0B |
|  |
| 1DB4650A89BC7C810953160C6E41A36547E8CF0B                         |

#### **C&C** servers

amazon.panasocin[.]com

office.panasocin[.]com

okinawas.ssl443[.]org

#### Code signing certificates serial numbers

| D-Link Corporation:                  | 13:03:03:e4:57:0c:27:29:09:e2:65:dd:b8:59:de:ef |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Changing Information Technology Inc: | 73:65:ed:e7:f8:fb:b1:47:67:02:d2:93:08:39:6f:51 |
|                                      | le:50:cc:3d:d3:9b:4a:cc:5e:83:98:cc:d0:dd:53:ea |

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Anton Cherepanov 9 Jul 2018 - 12:28PM



Ammyy Admin compromised with malware again; World Cup used as cover



New Telegram-abusing Android RAT discovered in the wild



BackSwap malware finds innovative ways to empty bank accounts



One year later: EternalBlue exploit more popular now than during WannaCryptor outbreak

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