Hunting the Shadows: In Depth Analysis of Escalated APT Attacks

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Agenda

- Why Taiwan?
- The “Lstudio” player… fun ☺
- Taking a peek at Weaponry
- APT in a Cloud
- Victimology or … chicken-logy?

whoweare

@bensonwu



[secret]



@fygrave

[censored]

Based in Taiwan
Interests in Computer Forensics
Access to some raw network traffic data (fun!)
Get to fish interesting things (PROFFFIIITT!)

Disclaimer

A few words before we move on.

- With this research we are primarily interested in understanding the Ops and victims of discussed targeted attacks. We DO NOT attempt to perform any attribution of potential attackers.

Taiwan has been a frontline of APT battlefield for some time

TAIPEI 台北時報 TIMES

Cabinet says computers under attack

INFORMATION WARFARE : A Cabinet spokesman said Beijing is waging a campaign designed to access databases in Taiwan thro

By Ko Shu-ling

Thu, Sep 04, 2

y of hackers based in China's Hubei and Fujian provinces has
rograms to the networks 10 private high-tech companies here to
30 different government agencies and 50 private companies."

China has launched a systematic information warfare campaign against Taiwan, spreading Trojan-horse programs into private companies' computers as a means to break into government databases, the Cabinet said yesterday.

"National intelligence has indicated that an army of hackers based in China's Hubei and Fujian provinces has successfully spread 23 different Trojan horse programs to the networks 10 private high-tech companies here to use them as a springboard to break into at least 30 different government agencies and 50 private companies."

Many interesting things could be observed (though this is not “Lstudio” group)



Elirks: earlier campaign

Reported by Dell/Secureworks as Elirks http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/chasing_apt/



Elirks evolution

http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!uzrxZwSGHxowPMGZAaj4l5

http://blog.yam.com/minzhu0906/article/54726977

http://diary.blog.yam.com/bigtree20130514/article/10173342

http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!



Elirks 2.0 – silly to reuse the address-space



Managed by the same
IP addresses
(easy to cross-correlate)



Another on-going Campaign

On average, 48 APT emails a week!


The “Lstudio” group:
Exploring fun things in a greater detail :)
隨裕而安
http://yuann.myphotos.cc/

They start with a boring spearphhiiissh



Almost clean :)



The APT Landscape in Taiwan



We'll examine the "LStudio" group today

- Unique indicators of the "LStudio" group:
  - Debug symbols (.pdb)
  - "horse" label and generator tag
- Some curious discoveries from the "Lstudio" backend data center … ;-)

LStudio binaries have cute things

http://scan.xecure-lab.com



CSJ-Elise ..

Process Memory Report

Process Name	Address	
svchost.exe		C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchos C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchos
	10000000	%USERPROFILE%\Templates\ The analyzed code segment has behavior, APT-Malware
		118.163.217.37 (118.163.217.37:
		118.163.217.37 (http://118.163.21
		118.163.60.73 (118.163.60.73:44
		140.105.135.71 (140.105.135.71:
		http:// Host: %s %s=;expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 (net user net localgroup administrators net view netstat -ano tasklist /v net start systeminfo 0x03, Connect Failed.! \000ELISEA310.TMP

Malware Behavior Graph



TAABAMoGvBjTVXHUHaibnwrAWfchx2x17Rf2roRBnbD/9lu13lWnlAUbBgqw+YNld2vcV5krtXoG__FXI43BxueF4FChFrk
SRgNVP2WQ==

http://140.105.135.71:443/2995ebc9/page_12180900.html
http://118.163.60.73:443/2995ebc9/page_12180912.html

They love fast cars ☺

FASST CARS ☺

Evora

Lstudio Operations and C2



“Lstudio” payload Generator



We don't say victim

肉雞 = G



The typical botnet model



Very advanced Zoo-management skills :)

APT advanced farming :)

- Operated by roughly 25 “farmers”
- Has controlled over 5,884 machines
- International coverage over 30 countries
- Utilizes 4 different Botnet software families
- Active since 2007

The “Lstudio” Chicken Cloud ☺



.. And who are the Chicken ?! ☺

International Chicken Farm Corp.

chicken farms went international



Share some Chicken ☺



When you travel, your chicken travel too… ☺

Lets look at some travelers ☺

US

England

Canada



Taiwan

France

ANOTHER DISCOVERY!!

.. do have 9 to 5 job ;)…



Just like some security researchers do ☺

AND THE LAST .. SOME HANDY TOOLS TO SHARE ☺

XecScan: Free API



Date	2013-07-06 02:26:40
Type	EXE
Size	118784
Hash	MD5 : 68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb [VT] (Download) SHA1: 6c4786b792f13643d408199e1b5d43f6473f5eea

Xecure Lab

Information

Malware	APT00N00 The analyzed sample has these behaviors: **Ability with network behavior, APT-Malware**
CVE	
Sample Time	2012-09
Malware File	• %USERPROFILE%\68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb.EXE MD5 = 68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb [VT] Build Time = 2012-09-18 20:30:16 (Download)
Autorun	• HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINDOWS\LOAD\
Mutex	
C&C	• blog.yam.com [VT UQ TU]
Agent Name	
URL String	• http://blog.yam.com/minzhu0906/article/54726977 • BLOG.YAM.COM

Yara: a swiss-knife of static sigs ;)

Yara Rule

```
meta:
      author = "XecScan API 2.0 beta"
      date = "2013-07-06 02:26:40"
      description = "scan.xecure-lab.com"
      hash0 = "68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb"

strings:
     $string0 = "blog.yam.com"
     $string1 = "http://blog.yam.com/minzhu0906/article/54726977"
     $string2 = "BLOG.YAM.COM"
     $string3 = ""

condition:
          any of them
}
```

Snort Rule

```
alert udp $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"APT C2 blog.yam.com"; flow:to_server; byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,2;
content:"|4|blog|3|yam|3|com"; nocase; fast_pattern:only; metadata:impact_flag red, policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips
drop, service dns; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:1689700070; rev:1;)
```

Similar Malware

Yara use

Easy to integrate with your scripts

Integration with a proxy server is possible via icap yara plugin: https://github.com/fygrave/c_icap_yara

Raw network traffic monitoring project (and http/DNS indexing):

https://github.com/fygrave/eyepkflow

More cool tools

Moloch https://github.com/aol/moloch

Yara mail
https://github.com/kevthehermit/yaraMail

Yara pcap
https://github.com/kevthehermit/YaraPcap

Conclusions

Complex infrastructure

Operates since 2007

Multiple software versions

Multiple back-ends

Victims – government and private sector

Mainly Taiwan but also seen world-wide

Questions?

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