RUB

Smaller Keys for Code-based Cryptography: QC-MDPC McEliece Implementations on Embedded Devices CHES 2013, Santa Barbara, USA

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Motivation

- Factoring and discrete log problem vs. quantum computers
- Larger diversification of pk primitives needed
- McEliece and Niederreiter resist quantum attacks
- ...and can outperform classical cryptosystems
- Drawback: large keys (often \geq 50 kByte) vs. embedded devices
- Quasi-cyclic medium-density parity check codes (4800 bit pk, 80 bit security level) [MTSB12]

Open questions

- Performance on embedded devices?
- Which decoders should be used?
- Can existing decoders be improved?



Overview

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Efficient Decoding of MDPC Codes Implementing QC-MDPC McEliece Results

Conclusions

Background on (QC-)MDPC Codes

- Given a *t*-error correcting (n, r, w)-QC-MDPC code of length n
- Parity check matrix H consists of n₀ blocks, fixed row weight w

Code/Key Generation

- 1. Randomly pick n_0 first rows of parity check matrix blocks H_i $h_i \in F_2^n$ of weight w_i s.t. $w = \sum_{i=0}^{n_0-1} w_i$
- 2. Obtain remaining rows by r 1 quasi-cyclic shifts of h_i
- 3. $H = [H_0|H_1| \dots |H_{n_0-1}]$
- 4. Generator matrix of systematic form G = (I|Q),

$$\mathbf{Q} = \begin{pmatrix} (H_{n_0-1}^{-1} * H_0)^T \\ (H_{n_0-1}^{-1} * H_1)^T \\ \dots \\ (H_{n_0-1}^{-1} * H_{n_0-2})^T \end{pmatrix}$$

Background on (QC-)MDPC Codes





Generator matrix G



(QC-)MDPC McEliece

Encryption

Message
$$m \in F_2^{(n-r)}$$
, error vector $e \in_R F_2^n$, $wt(e) \le t$
 $x \leftarrow mG + e$

Decryption Let Ψ_H be a *t*-error-correcting MDPC decoding algorithm. $mG \leftarrow \Psi_H(mG + e)$ Extract *m* from the first (n - r) positions.

Parameters for 80-bit equivalent symmetric security [MTSB12] $n_0 = 2, n = 9600, r = 4800, w = 90, t = 84$

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Efficient Decoding of MDPC Codes

General Decoding Principle

- *1. Compute syndrome s* of the received codeword
- 2. Count the number of unsatisfied parity-check-equations $\#_{upc}$ for each codeword bit
- 3. Flip codeword bits that violate more than b equations
- 4. Recompute syndrome
- 5. Repeat until s = 0 or reaching predefined maximum of iterations (decoding failure)
- Main difference is how threshold b is computed
 - Precompute b_i for each iteration [Gal62]
 - $b = max_{upc}$ [HP03]
 - $b = max_{upc} \delta$ [MTSB12]

Decoding Optimizations

Observations

- Decoders recompute syndrome after each iteration
- Syndrome computation is expensive!

Optimizations

- If threshold exceeded, flip codeword bit j
 → the syndrome changes
- Syndrome does not change arbitrarily! $s_{new} = s_{old} + h_j$
- \rightarrow No syndrome recomputation
- \rightarrow Decoding with up-to-date syndrome





Benchmarking

- Derived several decoders
 - Direct vs. temporary syndrome update
 - Different threshold techniques
- Decoding failure if no success within 10 iterations
- C implementation on Intel Xeon E5345 CPU@2.33 GHz
- 1000 random QC-MDPC codes with

 $n_0 = 2, n = 9600, r = 4800, w = 90, t = 84$

100,000 random decoding tries for each decoder

Proposed Decoder 1

- 1. Compute the syndrome
- 2. Count $\#_{upc}$ for each bit, flip the current codeword bit j if $\#_{upc}$ exceeds threshold b_i and add h_j to the syndrome

Proposed Decoder 2

Decoder 1 + additionally checks s = 0 after each update

*See paper for a full description of all evaluated decoders



Average decoding iterations



Decoding time

Decoding failure rate





Decoding failure rate (zoom)

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Implementation Platforms

- Reconfigurable Hardware: Xilinx Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T FPGA
 - Powerful FPGA
 - 37,680 slices, each slice has four 6-input LUTs and eight FFs
- Embedded microcontroller: Atmel AVR ATxmega256A3
 - Low-cost 8-bit microcontroller
 - 16 kByte SRAM, 256 kByte program memory
 - Clocked at 32 MHz





FPGA Design Considerations

Overall FPGA design goal: high speed

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Secure Hardware

- Relatively small keys → store operands directly in logic, no BRAMs
- Implemented proposal 1, early exit requires variable rotations
- Excluded TRNG for error generation and CCA2 conversion



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Microcontroller Design Considerations

Overall microcontroller design goal: small memory footprint

Encoder

- Straightforward: rotate and accumulate
- Rolled vs. unrolled public key rotation

Decoder (based on Proposal 2)

- Generating the next h_i requires to shift 4800 bit (600 byte)
- But rows are sparse, storing positions of set bits needs 45 counters
- Shifting requires to increment 45 counters
- Adding sparse to full polynomial by flipping 45 bits

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FPGA Results

- Post-PAR for Xilinx Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T
- Encryption takes 4,800 cycles
- Average decryption cycles
 - Small: 4,800 + 2 + 2.4002 * (9,620 + 2) = 27,896.7 cycles
 - Fast: 4,800 + 2 + 2.4002 * (4,810 + 2) = 16,351.8 cycles

Aspect	Encoder	Decoder (small)	Decoder (fast)
FFs	14,426 (4%)	32,974 (10%)	46,515 (15%)
LUTs	8,856 (5%)	36,554 (24%)	46,249 (30%)
Slices	2,920 (7%)	10,271 (27%)	17,120 (45%)
Frequency	$351.3\mathrm{MHz}$	$222.5\mathrm{MHz}$	$190.6\mathrm{MHz}$
Time/Op	$13.66\mathrm{\mu s}$	$125.38\mathrm{\mu s}$	$85.79\mu s$
Throughput	$351.3\mathrm{Mbit/s}$	$38.3\mathrm{Mbit/s}$	$55.9\mathrm{Mbit/s}$
Encode	4,800 cycles		
Compute Syndrome	=	4,800 cycles	4,800 cycles
Check Zero	-	2 cycles	2 cycles
Flip Bits	=	9,620 cycles	4,810 cycles
Overall average	4,800 cycles	27,896.7 cycles	16,351.8 cycles

FPGA Comparison

- PK size: 0.59 kByte vs. 100.5 kByte [SWM⁺10], 63.5 kByte [GDU⁺12]
- Performance evaluation: Time/operation vs. Mbit/s
- Faster than previous McEliece implementations

Scheme	Platform	$f \; [\mathrm{MHz}]$	\mathbf{Bits}	$\operatorname{Time}/\operatorname{Op}$	Cycles	Mbit/s	Slices	BRAM
This work (enc)	XC6VLX240T	351.3	4,800	$13.66\mathrm{\mu s}$	4,800	351.3	2,920	0
This work (dec)	XC6VLX240T	190.6	4,800	$85.79\mathrm{\mu s}$	16,352	55.9	$17,\!120$	0
This work (dec iter.)	$\rm XC6VLX240T$	222.5	4,800	$125.38\mu\mathrm{s}$	$27,\!897$	38.3	$10,\!271$	0
McEliece (enc) [SWM ⁺ 10]	XC5VLX110T	163	512	$500\mu{ m s}$	n/a	1.0	$14,\!537$	75^{1}
McEliece (dec) $[SWM^+10]$	XC5VLX110T	163	512	$1,\!290\mathrm{\mu s}$	n/a	0.4	$14,\!537$	75^{1}
McEliece (dec) $[GDU^+12]$	XC5VLX110T	190	1,751	$500\mu{ m s}$	$94,\!249$	3.5	$1,\!385$	5

Encoder

- Very frequent memory access (>50% of the runtime)
- 0.8s@32Mhz

Decoder

- Shifting sparse polynomial in 720 cycles
- Adding sparse polynomial to syndrome in 2,200 cycles
- Again very frequent memory access
- 2.7sec@32Mhz

	Platform	SRAM	Flash
[enc]	ATxmega256	606 Byte	3,705 Byte
[enc unrolled]	ATxmega256	606 Byte	5,496 Byte
[dec]	ATxmega256	198 Byte	2,218 Byte

Microcontroller Comparison

- Much smaller than previous McEliece implementations
- Faster and smaller than RSA
- More cycles/op than most competitors

Scheme	Platform	SRAM	Flash	$\operatorname{Cycles}/\operatorname{Op}$	Cycles/byte
This work [enc] This work [enc unrolled] This work [dec]	ATxmega256 ATxmega256 ATxmega256	606 Byte 606 Byte 198 Byte	3,705 Byte 5,496 Byte 2,218 Byte	37,440,137 26,767,463 86,874,388	62,400 44,612 146,457
McEliece [enc] [13] McEliece [dec] [13]	ATxmega256 ATxmega256	512 Byte 12 kByte	438 kByte 130.4 kByte	14,406,080 19,751,094	$65,781 \\ 90,187$
McEliece [enc] [20] McEliece [dec] [20]	ATxmega256 ATxmega256	3.5 kByte 8.6 kByte	11 kByte 156 kByte	6,358,400 33,536,000	39,493 208,298
McEliece [enc] [10] McEliece [dec] [10]	ATxmega256 ATxmega256	-	-	4,171,734 14,497,587	260,733 906,099
ECC-P160 [19]	ATmega128	282 Byte	3682 Byte	$6,\!480,\!000$	324,000
RSA-1024 random [19]	ATmega128	930 Byte	6292 Byte	87,920,000	686,875

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- High throughput FPGA and low memory footprint microcontroller implementations with **practical** key sizes
- Two optimized QC-MDPC decoders
- Incentive for further cryptanalytical investigation to establish confidence
- Source code (C and VHDL) available at

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Secure Hardware

http://www.sha.rub.de/research/projects/code/

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Thank you! Questions?

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FPGA Comparison

- Performance evaluation: Time/operation vs. Mbit/s
- PK size: 0.59 kByte vs. 100.5 kByte [38], 63.5 kByte [16][21]

Scheme	Platform	f [MHz]	\mathbf{Bits}	Time/Op	Cycles	Mbit/s	\mathbf{FFs}	LUTs	Slices	BRAM
This work (enc)	XC6VLX240T	351.3	4,800	$13.66\mathrm{ps}$	4,800	351.3	14,426	8,856	2,920	0
This work (dec)	XC6VLX240T	190.6	4,800	$85.79\mu s$	16,352	55.9	46,515	46,249	17,120	0
This work (dec iter.)	XC6VLX240T	222.5	$4,\!800$	$125.38\mathrm{\mu s}$	$27,\!897$	38.3	$32,\!974$	36,554	$10,\!271$	0
McEliece (enc) [38]	XC5VLX110T	163	512	$500\mathrm{ps}$	n/a	1.0	n/a	n/a	14,537	75^{1}
McEliece (dec) [38]	XC5VLX110T	163	512	$1,\!290\mathrm{\mu s}$	n/a	0.4	n/a	n/a	14,537	75^{1}
McEliece (dec) [16]	XC5VLX110T	190	1,751	$500\mu{ m s}$	94,249	3.5	n/a	n/a	$1,\!385$	5
Niederreiter (enc) [21]	XC6VLX240T	300	192	$0.66\mathrm{\mu s}$	200	290.9	875	926	315	17
Niederreiter (dec) [21]	XC6VLX240T	250	192	$58.78\mathrm{\mu s}$	14,500	3.3	$12,\!861$	9,409	3,887	9
Ring-LWE (enc) [17]	XC6VLX240T	n/a	256	$8.10\mathrm{\mu s}$	n/a	15.8	143,396	298,016	n/a	0^2
Ring-LWE (dec) [17]	XC6VLX240T	n/a	256	$8.15\mathrm{\mu s}$	n/a	15.7	$65,\!174$	$124,\!158$	n/a	0^2
NTRU (enc/dec) $[23]$	XCV1600E	62.3	251	$1.54/1.41\mu{ m s}$	96/88	163/178	5,160	$27,\!292$	$14,\!352$	0
ECC-P224 [18]	XC4VFX12	487	224	$365.10\mathrm{\mu s}$	177,755	0.61	1,892	1,825	1,580	11^{3}
ECC-163 [34]	XC5VLX85T	167	163	$8.60\mu s$	1436	18.9	n/a	10,176	3,446	0
ECC-163 [35]	Virtex-4	45.5	163	$12.10\mathrm{\mu s}$	552	13.4	n/a	n/a	12,430	0
ECC-163 [12]	Virtex-II	128	163	$35.75\mu s$	4576	4.56	n/a	n/a	2251	6
RSA-1024 [42]	XC5VLX30T	450	1,024	$1,520\mathrm{ps}$	684,000	0.67	n/a	n/a	3,237	5^4

QC-MDPC Encryption

- Given first 4800-bit row g of G and message m, compute x = mG + e
- G is of systematic form \rightarrow first half of x is equal to m
- Computation of redundant part
 - Iterate over message bit by bit and rotate g accordingly
 - If message bit is set, XOR current g to the redundant part

QC-MDPC Decryption

- Syndrome computation $s = Hx^T$, with $H = [H_0|H_1]$
 - Given 9600-bit $h = [h_0|h_1]$ and $x = [x_0|x_1]$
 - Sequentially iterate over every bit of x_0 and x_1 in parallel, rotate h_0 and h_1 accordingly
 - If bit in x_0 and/or x_1 is set, XOR current h_0 and/or h_1 to intermediate syndrome
- *s* = 0?
 - Logical OR tree, lowest level based on 6-input LUTs
 - Added registers to minimize critical path

QC-MDPC McEliece FPGA Implementation

- Count $\#_{upc}$ for current row $h = [h_0|h_1]$
 - \rightarrow Compute HW(s AND h_0), HW(s AND h_1)
 - Split AND results into 6-bit blocks and lookup HW
 - Adder tree with registers on every level accumulates overall HW
 - Parallel vs. iterative design
- Bit-flipping step
 - If HW exceeds threshold b_i the corresponding bit in codeword x_0 and/or x_1 is flipped
 - Syndrome is updated by XORing current secret poly h_0 and/or h_1
 - Generate next row h and repeat