Mirek Kratochvil
760bcdc7f7
new encryption algos with xsynd/chacha20
2014-04-09 16:14:31 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
5c739804fd
algos_enc: macro-squash algorighm definitions
2014-04-09 15:29:34 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
37d9c9a98e
algos_enc: make timing&sidechannel attacks harder
...
There was possible timing information leaking from failed decryptions,
new code makes the whole thing fail in almost the same time in all
cases.
2014-04-05 13:04:29 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
fd489ae69f
generator: remove rc4 usage, some cleaning
2014-04-05 11:36:50 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
e687629323
sc: stream cipher abstraction applied to arcfour
...
A minor bug was discovered in padding of short message signatures. If is
silently fixed, causing some (very minor) incompatibility of signatures
with previous versions.
2014-03-19 09:30:59 +01:00
Mirek Kratochvil
594e3c0ebc
algos_enc: clarify padding checks
2013-10-06 09:18:08 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
3deffb0ebe
build: crypto++ support is now optional
...
possibly also evading "traditional" hash functions. Cubehash is good.
2013-09-30 11:49:42 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
c65557724e
algos_enc: new cubehash-based algorithms
2013-09-29 20:48:59 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
47ccc8dcf0
algos_enc: forgotten stdint include
2013-09-15 15:33:47 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
93dee89a4a
algos_enc: do not collide with library min() macro
2013-09-15 15:09:01 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
66d7d84b13
fix CXXFLAGS="-Wall" warnings
2013-07-23 15:58:02 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
18449bdc8a
arcfour: greatly increase discard parameters
...
Okay, this thing got public so it's time to make the RC4 rugged. Not
that I'd know about something that would break current implementation,
but it's nice to at least do the recommended discard correctly.
We'll probably be adding better symmetric ciphers anyway.
Note that this is an incompatible change (again). FMTSeq private keys
will need to be replaced. Existing signature validity doesn't change.
Encrypted messages will not be possible to decrypt.
2013-05-25 17:13:33 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
3f73ba54c4
algos_enc: use faster unranking for decryption
2013-05-17 15:16:42 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
63d51911f9
algos_enc: also pad beginning of the message
...
to avoid possible known plaintext attacks on the symmetric cipher when
beginning of the ciphertext is known (which is a common situation, e.g.
when sign+encrypting)
2013-05-03 14:26:00 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
1553c09d20
algos_enc: mceqd192 variant to match fmtseq192
2013-05-01 16:44:31 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
e19ba185b7
algos_enc: padding for hiding message length
2013-04-22 14:56:20 +02:00
Mirek Kratochvil
805df12176
algos_enc: works
2013-01-26 22:55:56 +01:00
Mirek Kratochvil
7a48eff37a
algos_enc: f-o decryption
2013-01-18 11:38:37 +01:00
Mirek Kratochvil
0f2db0b62c
algos_enc: work, fujisaki-okamoto encryption
2013-01-17 16:31:34 +01:00
Mirek Kratochvil
0b487201ff
algos_enc: padding fix
...
I have indeed heard that everyone always fucks this up and therefore
kindof hoped to make an exception. Lasted two minutes.
2013-01-17 12:08:40 +01:00
Mirek Kratochvil
c345408cc8
algos_enc: padding
2013-01-17 12:05:01 +01:00
Mirek Kratochvil
5f49e3aa39
algorithms: encryption algs work
2013-01-16 22:30:03 +01:00
